Genealogy, culture and technomyth: decolonizing western information technologies, from open source to the maker movement by Jordan, Timothy & Braybrooke, Kaitlyn Marie
Genealogy, culture and technomyth: decolonizing western 
information technologies, from open source to the maker 
movement
Article  (Published Version)
http://sro.sussex.ac.uk
Jordan, Timothy and Braybrooke, Kaitlyn Marie (2017) Genealogy, culture and technomyth: 
decolonizing western information technologies, from open source to the maker movement. Digital 
Culture and Society, 3 (1). pp. 25-46. ISSN 2364-2114 
This version is available from Sussex Research Online: http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/68148/
This document is made available in accordance with publisher policies and may differ from the 
published  version or from the version of record. If you wish to cite this item you are advised to 
consult the publisher’s version. Please see the URL above for details on accessing the published 
version. 
Copyright and reuse: 
Sussex Research Online is a digital repository of the research output of the University.
Copyright and all moral rights to the version of the paper presented here belong to the individual 
author(s) and/or other copyright owners.  To the extent reasonable and practicable, the material 
made available in SRO has been checked for eligibility before being made available. 
Copies of full text items generally can be reproduced, displayed or performed and given to third 
parties in any format or medium for personal research or study, educational, or not-for-profit 
purposes without prior permission or charge, provided that the authors, title and full bibliographic 
details are credited, a hyperlink and/or URL is given for the original metadata page and the 
content is not changed in any way. 
DCS | Digital Culture and Society | Vol. 3, Issue 1 | © transcript 2017
DOI 10.14361/dcs-2017-0103
Genealogy, Culture and Technomyth
Decolonizing Western Information Technologies, 
from Open Source to the Maker Movement
Kat Braybrooke and Tim Jordan
Abstract
Western-derived maker movements and their associated fab labs and 
hackerspaces are being lauded by some as a global industrial revo-
lution, responsible for groundbreaking digital “entanglements” that 
transform identities, practices and cultures at an unprecedented rate 
(Anderson 2014; Hills 2016). Assertions proliferate regarding the 
societal and entrepreneurial beneits of these “new” innovations, with 
positive impacts ascribed to everything, from poverty to connectivity. 
However, contradictory evidence has started to emerge, suggesting 
that a heterogeneous set of global cultural practices have been homog-
enized. This paper employs a materialist genealogical framework to 
deconstruct three dominant narratives about information technolo-
gies, which we call “technomyths” in the tradition of McGregor et al. 
After outlining the maker movement, its assumptions are examined 
through three lesser-cited examples: One Laptop per Child in Peru, 
jugaad in India and shanzhai copyleft in China. We then explore 
two preceding technomyths: Open Source and Web 2.0. In conclusion, 
we identify three key aspects as constitutive to all three technomyths: 
technological determinism of information technologies, neoliberal 
capitalism and its “ideal future” subjectivities and the absence and/or 
invisibility of the non-Western.
Introduction
Western-derived maker movements and their associated DIY (Do It Yourself) 
workshops, fab labs, shared machine shops and hackspaces are being lauded by 
some as a global industrial revolution, responsible for the emergence of ground-
breaking digital “entanglements” that transform identities, practices and cultures 
at a rate not seen since the Enlightenment (Anderson 2014; Hills 2016). Assertions 
proliferate regarding the widespread societal beneits of these “new” innovations, 
with positive impacts ascribed to everything from poverty (i. e. Code for America) 
to connectivity (i. e. Facebook’s Free Basics).
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However, contrary evidence has started to emerge, suggesting that a hetero-
geneous set of globalized cultural practices are being systematically homoge-
nized (Maxigas 2014; Nascimento 2014; Fleischmann et al. 2016). These criti-
cisms have engendered many scholarly debates, some deriding making practices 
as “fringe phenomena” based on possible rather than actual usage of digital 
tools (Smith 2014; Troxler/Maxigas 2014; Maldini 2016). Others note that maker 
subcultures are often marred by cronyism, corporatization and reductionism 
(Braybrooke 2011; Csikszentmihályi 2012; Ray Murray/Hand 2014; Toupin 2014; 
Maldini 2016). While such critiques often contest what it is makers actually do 
in fablabs, hackerspaces, shared machine shops and other site-based maker 
communities, in this paper we ask what narratives are being disseminated about 
these practices, which frame the maker movement (and other popular techno-
cultural tales like it) as a revolution. In this sense, our starting point is an explo-
ration of claims regarding the conception of the maker movement by those like 
Anderson and Hills in order to explore the efects that such a conceptualization 
may have.
To undertake this analysis, we irst outline the predominant narrative about 
the maker movement which is commonly used in Western popular culture. We 
then compare this account to three lesser-cited examples of making movements: 
One Laptop per Child hacks in Peru, jugaad practices in India and shanzhai 
copyleft production in China. This comparison suggests the concept of a “techno-
myth,” in which technologies are “narrated” in ways that create a larger story about 
society whose key component is a determinism of our experiences of the world 
through our experiences of technology (McGregor 1987). To further establish this 
view, we then explore two other popular narratives about information technology 
innovations that have preceded the maker movement: Open Source and Web 2.0. 
Underpinning this analysis is a use of a genealogical method that is developed 
through feminist materialism (Foucault 1977a; Haraway 1991; Butler 1997). By 
examining these three “myths of information technology” through materialist 
genealogy, we are able to critique the assumptions embedded within them, 
particularly their technological determinism, their assumption of the values of 
neoliberal capitalism and the various ways they may render Global South and non-
Western perspectives invisible.
Analysing narratives of technological change as myths
Because it is useful to begin with a common frame in discussing the term “maker 
movement,” we refer to Erica Halverson and Kimberly Sheridan’s 2014 deinition 
as “the growing number of people who are engaged in the creative production of 
artifacts in their daily lives, and who ind physical and digital forms to share their 
processes and products with others” (496). Although such deinitions, and their 
accompanying stories and narratives, as Halverson and Sheridan’s, do include 
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speciic examples, they also propose wider societal and cultural themes that 
frame, ilter and interpret both examples and evidence. It seems appropriate then 
to refer to these wider themes as narratives, creating “myths” because their role 
as interpreter is their key characteristic. By “myths,” we refer to stories which use 
empirically veriiable moments to also disseminate wide-reaching claims about 
revolutionary change and transformation. We do not mean that these myths are 
straightforwardly false but rather that they have a complicated relationship with 
empirical facts, because conirming the truth or falsity of relevant facts is not the 
key function of a myth – whereas “telling the story” is.
The tales we are interested in here are technologically focused, and so we 
implement the term “technomyth” in the tradition of McGregor’s (1987) readings 
of popular cultural inluences in The United States to describe them. Paul 
Dourish and Genevieve Bell build on the idea of the technomyth to argue it is a 
foundational story, a method by which a mythical future is constructed and then 
predicted simply by inventing it (2011). In the case of ubiquitous computing in the 
early 1990s, for example, the notion of progress became a self-fulilling prophecy, 
with technotale rhetoric itself becoming a myth, a method for making sense of the 
future that seemed to appear “magically [yet] also manageably” (Dourish/Bell 2011: 
2). Key elements involved “heroes, seemingly impossible tasks, perils, pitfalls, and 
dangers, and of course, in the end, glory” (2011: 2), and as the story itself became 
foundational to scholars in computer science and related ields, resulting techno-
myths regarding ubiquitous computing as a transformational force which would 
“change social relations, social order and daily life” (2011: 3) would in turn shape 
future innovations in their own image.
In our exploration of technomyths, we have additionally chosen to appropriate 
the critical method of genealogy for our analysis because of its speciic concern for 
absences and silences and its further critique of the ways that the origins of a story 
often authorize the meaning of that story. Three principles are key to a genealogical 
approach (Jordan 2016). First, history is not written with the present at its deining 
frame; it is not teleological and avoids “victor’s history” (Edgerton 2011). Second, 
genealogy pays attention to things that appear to have no history – love or hate for 
example. Finally, absences are identiied to be analysed. These three principles 
come together in a critique of origins which suggests that where there is a narra-
tive about the origins of a technomyth, the origin may itself do considerable work 
articulating the nature of that technomyth. An origin does not record but instead 
helps produce the myth (Foucault 1977a; Nietzsche 2013). Genealogy, therefore, is 
a form of troubling the narratives we are told about regarding the nature of larger 
technological interventions.
Nietzsche famously argued that genealogy should be “grey,” concerning 
itself with “what is documented, what can actually be conirmed and has actually 
existed” (Nietzsche 2013: 7), which we interpret using feminist materialism 
because the latter has articulated a position which focuses on issues of power in 
the construction of narratives. Feminist materialism, in this sense, provides a 
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further basis for objectivity in its care and concern for the materiality, for the inter-
actions – and, in Barad’s sense, intra-actions – through which a technomyth like 
the Western conception of the maker movement is itself maintained (Barad 2007). 
Moreover, this kind of hands-on materialism comes with a focus on the politics, 
the values and the forms of power that course through a technomyth (Haraway 
1991; Harding 1991).
Our frame is, therefore, a genealogically and feminist-inspired critique of the 
kinds of techno-narratives within which myths are embedded. We understand 
our frame as a situated and materialist analysis of the ways in which complex 
social, cultural and technological constructs are created and maintained as forms 
of power. While such a critique is applicable to many social and cultural forms, 
in this paper we direct it irst towards some of the key technomyths of our time. 
Starting with the maker movement, we then demonstrate how similar forms of 
power and hegemony found in the maker movement can also be found in other 
key technomyths like Open Source and Web 2.0, together reconstructing social, 
cultural and technological landscapes of the 21st century according to particular 
forms of power. We do not want to suggest these myths are themselves false. 
Instead we want to, in the tradition of Dourish and Bell, draw attention to “the 
ideas that animate and drive” (2011: 2) the popular subjectivity of technomythical 
notions and their conceptions of social and human progress.
The maker movement as technomyth
In 2012, former WIRED editor-in-chief Chris Anderson’s book Makers: The New 
Industrial Revolution became a best-seller in America, praising the country’s 
proliferation of Maker Faires and DIY tools as signs of a new industrial revolu-
tion, where fabrication of consumer items would liberate a new generation of 
makers, meaning “the path from ‘inventor’ to ‘entrepreneur’ [becomes] so fore-
shortened it hardly exists at all any more” (Anderson 2012). Dale Dougherty, who 
has been named a “Champion of Change” by the White House and is gener-
ally credited for popularizing the maker movement through his company Maker 
Media (an ailiate of the Silicon Valley conglomerate O’Reilly Media), further 
reinforces an emerging assumption that, through the democratization of digital 
tools, “making” has become a universal element of human identity, “describ[ing] 
each one of us, no matter how we live our lives or what our goals might be” (2012: 
11). Shingy, AOL’s “Digital Prophet,” adds his own advertiser-friendly elucidation 
of maker culture as an opportunity for “curated nichiness,” a brave new world 
where consumers get “experiences delivered […] in neat packages that make us 
feel as though we are discovering them” (Perlis 2014). Here, the initial elements 
of a technomyth show themselves both in the story being told and in the fervour 
it is told with.
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In this tale, we are presented with a world where everyone has the freedom to 
make their own products through “prosumerism,” a hands-on form of capitalism 
that exploits consumer creativity (Paltrinieri/Esposti 2013). This imaginary is 
echoed in many places across the West, from scholarly articles and presentations 
throughout America, Canada, Europe, and Australia to popular technology maga-
zines like Wired and Make, the branding of which is aggressively protected by the 
O’Reilly Corporation (Hertz 2012: 4–6; Ray Murray/Hand 2014). A 2014 TIME 
Magazine exposé argued that the maker movement is essential to today’s America, 
with its greatest success being the way it “bring[s] techies and non-techies alike 
into the world of being creators” (Bajarin 2014). The possibilities of celebrating 
“your right to tweak, hack, and bend any technology to your own will” (in 2016 the 
slogan of Make magazine) has inspired several enthusiastic accounts of a “renais-
sance of the DIY movement with a high-tech facet” (Mota 2011: 283) happening 
around the world.
The maker movement narrative, here, becomes a means of understanding 
widespread sociotechnical changes (like those of ubiquitous computing) since the 
rise of hands-on tools like 3D printers, laser cutters, biosensors, Arduinos and 
Raspberry Pis and their embedding within so-called new community spaces like 
fab labs and hackspaces (Smith 2014). The myth’s core is revealed in the sugges-
tion that this lowering of digital technologies has placed in the hands of users 
the ability to become, for the irst time, their own creative economic producers. In 
this story of a “new industrial revolution” (Anderson 2012), we are ofered a neatly 
packaged and widely disseminated view of myriad disruptive technological inno-
vations, which, it is claimed, will lead to economic and political changes.
However, not everyone is convinced. In 2012, the then-director of the MIT 
Centre for Future Civic Media described his frustration: “What is [being] called 
‘making’ in North America and Europe is, frankly, a luxurious pastime of wealthy 
people […] all over what is called the Global South there have been makers every-
where, only they are not called makers” (Csikszentmihályi 2012: 9). We are also 
seeing increased accounts of discrimination and exclusion of makers and hackers 
in Western communities who do not it normative moulds, including women 
and cultural minorities (Braybrooke 2011; Toupin 2014). What if, in this spirit, 
we chose to shift our attention “from the new to the old, the big to the small, the 
spectacular to the mundane, the masculine to the feminine, the rich to the poor”? 
(Edgerton 2011: xiv). How might “making” be analysed by integrating accounts of 
“technology-as-use” with those of “technology-as-innovation”? And what might an 
interrogation of the West’s maker movement tell us more generally about techno-
myths? To pursue this line of thought, we will irst look at the practice of jugaad 
used by indigenous populations in India, then we will examine shanzhai produc-
tion in China, and inally we will look at how the One Laptop per Child initiative 
was reordered in Peru.
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Jugaad: Indigenous maker materialities in translation
Jugaad (or juggaar) is a colloquial Hindi and Punjabi word meaning an innovative 
ix or a simple workaround. It is used to describe creative and hands-on solutions 
to making that bend the rules of daily life, enabling practices deined by casual 
ubiquity (Ray Murray/Hand 2015). In a diferent tradition from making-as-leisure 
activity explored by a Western prosumer, jugaad-style making is employed by indi-
viduals throughout India as “community combinations of making-do, hacking, 
and frugal engineering” featuring recycled materials and other re-appropriated 
elements of consumer culture (Ray Murray/Hand 2012).
Communications scholar Amit S. Rai has pointed out an interesting way 
today’s jugaad is starting to move beyond its initial characterization as “individu-
alized, impoverished and frugal tinker[ing]” into a more “distributed nature […] 
across associated contexts and shifting timespaces” (Rai 2015: 991). Rai argues 
this is due to the term’s co-option by Indian cell phone companies in order to 
sell products that are marketed as subversive and rebellious (products which are 
then themselves often subverted by the very communities they are marketed 
at). From the 1990s onward, Indian telecommunications irms such as Bharti 
Airtel have featured instances of jugaad in their campaigns, branding products 
as “digital cool” (Rai 2015: 992). A more complicated interaction between efect 
and afect then emerges when the exact kind of “pirate modernity” (Rai 2015: 991) 
that is introduced by these companies is then reshaped by consumers, allowing 
objects to “exceed the intentions” of their original design, existing “outside of any 
one human’s grasp” (Ash 2015: 88). Rai provides the example of Haier washing 
machines in rural China, where they are used by villagers to wash vegetables, 
in turn inspiring Haier to aix parts more applicable to vegetable washing to 
newer models. This kind of interaction, Rai argues, reveals how the reframing 
of jugaad practices can be seen, though postcolonial analysis, as a translation of 
“unequal relations of power in contexts characterized by extreme poverty” though 
(re)making, where consumer needs are co-opted into the hegemonizing narrative 
of products, which are then themselves co-opted by local peoples (Rai 2015: 987).
While corporations may attempt to design thresholds and fail-safes into 
digital objects in order to control their efects, actual use can exceed and defy 
original intentions. Rai believes that the strategic multiplicities of these kinds of 
subversions reveal a potential for longer-term, distributed subaltern resistances 
that continue to subvert seemingly straightforward controls (Rai 2015: 992). Sekh-
saria further deines jugaad in this way, explaining that the complexity of the 
word’s use today suggests that it now represents
concept, process and product all rolled into one at the same time […] reconiguring mate-
rialities to overcome obstacles and ind solutions  […] working the system to one’s advan-
tage […] a synonym in certain contexts for gambling and corruption. Jugaad is not just an 
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inextricable part of local vocabularies in India, it is an integral part of the way life is lived and 
the world negotiated (2013: 137).
These kinds of hands-on maker materialities also thrive in other informal econo-
mies of the Global South, from Brazil to Kenya (Hertz 2012; Ray Murray/Hand 
2012; Vĩa 2012). In Colombia, making-as-technological-disobedience is called 
rebusque (rummaging), which describes the many side activities necessary to 
make a living, from selling phone cards to repairing neighbours’ computers in 
exchange for food, in an economy where 67 % of jobs are informal (Vĩa 2012). 
Vĩa quotes the Columbian radio station Caracol in explaining that “[i]n Medellin, 
20,000 people work in informal activities considered as Rebusque […] at the city 
centre, in the slums and even in commercial malls. They apply creativity to keep 
themselves active, included and productive” (2012).
These are examples of an increasingly signiicant body of evidence which 
reveals that “making” (starting with and moving beyond the maker movement 
technomyth) has been going on both well before and also at the same time as the 
movement’s rise in the West. If making can be deined not only as tinkering inno-
vation brought on by leisure time but also as creative, hands-on activities borne 
out of necessity, re-appropriating material aspects of life and digital technologies 
to ind solutions to local problems, then jugaad activities can be seen as making 
par excellence. Yet jugaad features nowhere in mainstreamed maker movement 
narratives. The communal, non-Western and non-information technology aspects 
of jugaad and other creative Global South practices suggest already that the maker 
movement technomyth has been feeding us not a vision of global revolution but 
instead one predetermined by capitalist, North American and information tech-
nology–based values.
Shanzhai: Copyleft making from a Chinese perspective
Another area dominated by a speciic kind of making narrative is that of the 
mobile phone industry. In a Western context, intellectual property laws apply 
to every aspect of a cell phone that potentially lies under copyright protection, 
including all “symbols, names, images, and designs used in commerce” (WIPO 
2002). However, in fast-growing technology hubs across China like Shenzhen, a 
diferent lineage of digital remix through making has unfolded, one that deies 
the patent-based logics of Western intellectual properties while championing 
uniquely Asian historical and cultural values.
This remixing is a practice called shanzhai (山寨), which emerged as a 
phenomenon in relation to mobile technologies around 2008 (Zhu/Shi 2010) and 
describes the production of cheap, copyright-infringing goods distributed across 
Asian markets, especially electronics. Shanzhai products are recreated from 
original brand-name variants in black-market factories; pirated copyleft methods 
Brought to you by | University of Sussex Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/5/17 1:38 PM
Kat Braybrooke and T im Jordan32
are employed that subvert local and international manufacturing licences. The 
result is a proliferation of cheap cell phones that are easy to purchase. “Like bandits 
of yore,” Vĩa explains, “shanzhai live by their own code, steal from the rich, and 
provide to the poor” (2012). In 2016, Townsend et al. (2016: 185) described the core 
rules that unite today’s shanzhais: “Do nothing from scratch; build on the best 
of what others have already done. Innovate process ceaselessly at small scales for 
speed and cost savings […] share as much as you can to make it easy for others to 
see your value.”
Not only is the present economic and legal context of shanzhai a challenge to 
the current maker movement technomyth but so is its temporality, as shanzhai 
itself predates making. The term was originally used as a metaphor to describe 
Chinese mountain bandits who opposed corrupt authorities as early as the 12th 
century (Hennessey 2011; Baidu 2013). It was then appropriated as Cantonese slang 
to describe low-end family factories that made equally low-end, poor-quality goods 
(Baidu 2013). This evolved into the more philosophical shanzhaiism (山寨主義), 
which connotes a kind of innovation that is seen as speciically “Chinese” in spirit, 
a return to the richness of traditional Chinese culture through fugu, or returning 
to the past (Hennessey 2011).
The disruptive, grassroots and copyleft values of shanzhai practices are also 
relected in the conception of the region’s hackerspaces. The irst such space in 
China, XinCheJian, opened in 2009 (Hertz 2012). Its founder, David Li, has 
said, “If it’s going to be copied anyway, it may just as well be open and shared” 
(Vĩa 2012). Denisa Kera (2012) has explored the ways that hackerspaces are 
emerging with similarly unique characteristics in other Asian nations as well. 
“Within [Asian] hackerspaces we are witnessing a ‘technological folklore’ devel-
oped by post-industrial (Singapore, Japan) as well as more traditional or indus-
trial communities (Indonesia) around technological solutions and scientiic inter-
ests, in which vernacular and cosmopolitan blend together […] reviv[ing] certain 
indigenous (but also pre-modern) practices of knowledge creation” (Kera 2012: 1). 
Through community spaces like these and the accumulation of cheap mobiles, 
China’s shanzhai recreation practices are now moving from Asia’s fringes to its 
mainstream (Hennessey 2011), with a recent estimate by the U. S. International 
Trade Commission putting the market share for shanzhai phones between 20 and 
38 % of mobile phone sales in China (2011).
Like jugaad, shanzhai describes a similar proliferation of making and remix-
based technocultures to those addressed in the maker movement, but it also repre-
sents a unique cultural context in relation to sharing and property that comes from 
a much longer history than that of Western making practices. As Silvia Lindtner 
inds in her 2015 ethnography of Chinese makers, the unique practices of the 
making and hackspace scene in China – making-do, reuse and mass (re)produc-
tion – demonstrate that the cultural assumptions of the maker movement’s core 
characteristics coming from the usual information technology hubs like Silicon 
Valley need to be re-examined. Chinese makers, she inds, are eager to move away 
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from mere re-appropriations of Western concepts regarding sharing and openness, 
instead inding passion in articulating “a unique culture of hacking with Chinese 
characteristics” deined by locally oriented traditions of industrial production and 
remix (Lindtner 2015). Again, we see the existing narrative about the origins of the 
maker movement questioned for its exclusion and absence of similar-yet-diferent 
practices in other cultures, and by examining this exclusion, we start to see what 
kinds of messages are embedded within making-as-technomyth.
One Laptop per Child: 
Western determinism and local subversion
The strange and ultimately hacked journey of MIT’s One Laptop per Child’s 
(OLPC) programme, which aimed to produce a laptop cheap enough to distribute 
at low cost worldwide, provides another example of the possibilities of indigenous, 
locally situated technological subversion. In 2007, mass production of the $ 100 
laptop started in the Changshu manufacturing centre near Shanghai. Pioneered 
by OLPC Foundation chairman and MIT Media Lab founder Nicholas Negroponte 
and hundreds of investors including “AMD, Brightstar, Chi Mei, Citigroup, eBay, 
Google, Marvell, News Corporation, Nortel Networks, Quanta Computer, Nortel 
and SES-Astra” (Buchele/Owusu-Aning 2007: 113), it was backed by the UN Devel-
opment Programme and lauded as a groundbreaking idea that would improve the 
lives of millions of children in developing countries by providing unprecedented 
access to knowledge while “building global solidarity” (Twist 2005; Chan 2014).
However, perhaps because of Negroponte’s “chronic resistance to learning 
from the lessons of local implementations” (Chan 2014), OLPC undertook only 
a cursory analysis of local traditions, cultures and communities before dropping 
laptops into classrooms in countries like Rwanda and Uruguay. As a result, recep-
tion of the laptops became increasingly critical; their Western-centric interfaces 
and content were seen as damaging to local needs (Buchele/Owusu-Aning 2007; 
Warschauer/Ame 2010; Say Chan 2012). In 2011, a global group of professors wrote 
an open letter against OLPC, outlining problems with the devices being imposed 
on developing nations using colonialist tactics “inappropriate for locals, simply 
to beneit a Western need […] for moral reinforcement” (Warschauer/Ame 2010).
One problem was that Western donors funded laptops without consulting 
local needs and instead of supporting other aid programmes already focused 
on improving social, infrastructural and educational conditions. Buchele and 
Owusu-Aning argue this is what may have led India to decline participation, 
quoting India’s education secretary who said in 2007 that “[w]e need classrooms 
and teachers more urgently than fancy tools” (2007: 114). But for many, OLPC’s 
problem was the belief that “beneits will be achieved by simply giving children 
technologies and getting out of their way, relecting naïve and technologically 
deterministic views” (Warschauer/Ame 2010), combined with cultural insensi-
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tivities in its assumption that a one-interface-its-all approach to design would 
carry the “power […] [to transform] realities as varied as Afghanistan or Uruguay” 
(Villanueva 2011). By the late 2000s, only a few hundred thousand laptops had 
been shipped to developing nations, despite the OLPC’s claim of 150 million by the 
end of 2007, and in places like Uruguay, only 21.5 % of teachers reported actually 
using them (Warschauer/Ame 2010).
However, in 2011 Say Chan found that something interesting had started to 
happen to OLPC’s XO laptop in Peru. In the rural region of Puno, locals recog-
nized the deep techno-fundamentalism of its “air drop” deployment model, 
noting that “when they arrived, there was no option [other than to accept them]” 
(2014). However, it is from here that the irst XO user manual, centred on teachers 
and distributed online in several languages, was published (Salas 2009), and 
also from here that localization workshops to translate software into indigenous 
languages were organized by activists, linguists and elders. This and other laptop 
modiications arose at least in part from strong local hack lab networks in Peru, 
who responded to OLPC techno-fundamentalism by cultivating “their own multi-
disciplinary global collaborations” aimed at proposing critical, local alternatives 
to Western expansion (Say Chan 2014). Re-appropriating a technology against its 
dominant narrative or myth in this way reveals that the technologies involved are 
not embedded as essential to the myth, nor is the myth itself essential to uses of 
the technologies.
We argue that these examples of jugaad, shanzhai and OLPC question the 
Western maker movement narrative. What we mean by this is that the proponents 
of the maker movement neglect similar cultures of technological use in a way that 
subsequently positions Western making practices as revolutionary innovations. 
Our issue here is not that the dominant maker movement technotale claims to be 
diferent from other cultural practices because it is based on speciic technologies 
and practices. Instead, we are concerned that by making the global claims it does, 
it masks a particularly local set of wide-reaching politics within its myth – politics 
buried within a seeming focus on technologies and practices. We can now begin to 
identify these politics by drawing out some common elements of critique from the 
examples we have given to question the maker movement technomyth.
First, there is a deep-rooted association with Western actors, who are assumed 
by the maker movement technomyth to be the core sources and legitimators of 
making practices. OLPC demonstrates this most clearly, as it literally represents 
the imposition of its version of a Western technoessentialism on the rest of the 
world, blithely assuming there are no cultural or technical problems in doing so. 
A genealogical overview of jugaad and shanzhai practices in India and in China 
demonstrates further that making itself carries a much longer and more diverse 
indigenous history than that of the current maker movement narrative. This 
essentialism seems driven by absence. Western understandings of making are 
not compared to those of other cultures but are simply “assumed”; the subaltern 
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exists, here, in the inability of the makers of jugaad, shanzhai and other traditions 
to speak within the dominant maker movement myth (Spivak 1988).
Second, there is a close association with late-stage capitalism here, or what 
is generally called neoliberalism, in the presumption that making practices only 
make sense within the dominant form of early 21st-century capitalism. There is, 
in particular, a concern for forming subjectivities that see individuals working 
outside of state control, with the emphasis being on a particular free market 
subjectivity that is consonant with broader neoliberal economic norms (Jarrett 
2008; Crouch 2011).
Finally, there is a technological determinism embedded in these tales which 
assumes that information technologies will actually produce the kinds of cultural 
and social efects claimed by the movement’s proponents. There is, then, within 
the diferent potential modes of technological determinism a focus on particular 
kinds of information technologies (Jordan 2008: 66–70).
Even at this high level of abstraction, we argue that “Western,” “neoliberal” 
and “deterministic” are the three key elements embedded within making as a 
technomyth. We recognize these are large and complex concepts which we cannot 
do justice here, but they reveal the politics embedded within the technomyth as 
critiqued by other making practices. To further this analysis, we will now augment 
our assertions by comparing them to two more signiicant technomyths from the 
last few decades, Open Source and Web 2.0. We do this to extend the discussion 
beyond an analysis of the maker movement to consider Western technomyths 
more generally and also to add nuance to what we mean by a technological politics 
that is Western, neoliberal and deterministic.
Open Source as technomyth: Free Software into good business
Open Source’s origins have already been canonized, making them ripe for the 
genealogist to take a look. The story unfolds, briely, in the following way. There 
existed, in Free Software and the Free Software Foundation, a process for creating 
software which was becoming recognized by many as producing higher-quality 
and more easily updated software than other existing methods. At its heart, free 
software demanded two things and implied one. First, full access to the source 
code was necessary so that any appropriately skilled software programmer could 
alter and improve the software. Second, any changes had to be committed back to 
others, so that anyone with relevant skills could use and improve the programme. 
These two demands implied a community of coders. Free Software gained recog-
nition in the 1990s for its ability to produce high-quality pieces of software, with 
several programmes (such as BIND) integral to the growing Internet (Weber 
2004: 1–8; Coleman 2013: 64–88).
A spectacular moment then occurred with the transition of the once-
dominant web browser Netscape from closed proprietary code to using free 
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software principles to share that code – and this galvanized a group of interested 
promoters of free software techniques who were concerned that the label “free” 
was restraining the use of the technique. A particular group of such interested 
coders and publicists met and agreed that the term “Open Source” might ofer a 
more neutral and attractive term than Free Software, and then began promoting 
it within the community and outside, gaining considerable purchase, even at the 
cost of creating a rift with strong free software advocates (Kelty 2008; Coleman 
2013: 77–79). This shift produced a major appropriation of software techniques 
within a new frame, which has had widespread success with the adoption of such 
software in many companies – for example Google and IBM rely heavily on Linux 
(Weber 2004).
Open Source Initiative co-founder, early free software propagandist, coder and 
co-architect of the shift to Open Source Eric Raymond outlined two reasons, at the 
moment of conceiving Open Source, as to why it was needed. In what Raymond 
calls “the original call to the community to start using the term ‘open source’ that 
I issued on 8 February 1998” (Raymond 1998), he argued:
Speciically, we have a problem with the term “free software,” itself, not the concept. 
I’ve become convinced that the term has to go. The problem with it is twofold. First, it’s 
confusing; the term “free” is very ambiguous […] Does “free” mean “no money charged?” or 
does it mean “free to be modiied by anyone,” or something else? Second, the term makes 
a lot of corporate types nervous. […] There’s now a chance we can make serious gains in the 
mainstream business world without compromising our ideals and commitment to tech-
nical excellence – so it’s time to reposition. We need a new and better label. (Raymond 1998)
What is the “concept” of free software that is being renamed here? Free software 
was irst formed as an idea in response to software becoming a commodity for 
sale. “Sale” meant that software had become subject to closed licences, enabling 
payment for a commodity that would otherwise be easily shareable through copies, 
and this required closed source code available only to its corporate owner. What 
Richard Stallman1 and others had experienced as a community of sharing coders 
was broken apart, as legally enforced secrecy arrived when programmes were 
1 It is worth noting that the meeting, and soon after the conference, which irst gave 
the term “Open Source” purchase did not include Stallman, which is both strange, 
because of his obvious and overwhelming commitment to the principles under dis-
cussion, and obvious, because he was perceived as a barrier because of his refusal to 
compromise. A further aspect we do not have time to go into here is the way Stallman 
and his politics have become often disparaged as that of a “crank” or “zealot.” There 
is a personalization of Stallman as a kind of “nut” which serves to make Open Source 
appear stable and reasonable compared to Free Software. This is not only useful to 
the technomyth of Open Source but also dismissive of Stallman’s ideas and highly 
ironic given the rather obvious “crankiness” of someone like Raymond.
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developed for sale (Williams 2002; Coleman 2013: 67–71). From this was born the 
desire for a return to coding as the result of a community who shared their work 
openly. What was required was the freedom to inspect and change the source code 
combined with the requirement to give back any changes. This requirement was 
eventually enforced through particular licences (e. g. GPL) aiming to legally bind 
the requirements that made free software. It is this concatenation of communal 
and technical values that Open Source found wanting, and which is missing from 
Open Source as a technomyth (Moody 2001; Weber 2004; Jordan 2008). We can 
also particularly see the focus of technological determinations on information 
technologies. Here we see source code as crucial to the nature of the technolo-
gies that are being disruptive and therefore the source of the new Open Source 
business and technology strategy. The communal side of free software is stripped 
away in Open Source to establish a narrative with, at its core, a business-friendly 
means of developing better software.
One further elision from this technomyth that is key to Open Source is the 
fact that Open Source emerged when the irst Internet inancial bubble was taking 
of (Kelty 2008: 98–110). The context for the transformation from Free Software to 
Open Source is not just one that focuses on a reductionist technique that removes 
the community and politics while taking an American (if not Silicon Valley)–
centred vision as normal but also one in which a major economic boom around 
the Internet had started. In the two years from the beginning of 1997 until the 
end of 1998, the birthtime of Open Source, the technology stock market NASDAQ 
rose by 71 % (Google 2016). The appeal to companies to use Open Source software, 
and the story told with it to convince those companies, was made at a inancially 
compelling time, when the irst Internet gold rush was happening. Lurking 
within the Open Source story is a commitment not just to spreading software 
principles but also to the urgency of spreading them, in a time of what seemed like 
easy wealth creation and the triumph of a new informational capitalism birthed 
in Silicon Valley.
We have seen how Open Source reads from – and obfuscates – the community 
and politics of Free Software, reducing a complex cultural position to a technically 
expedient one: from freedom to software production. We have seen how left as a 
trace within this story is its connection to capitalism and proit. Last, we should 
also note another absence, one of those silences that genealogy asks us to look 
for, because this is an American narrative. There are occasional mentions of the 
nationalities of some individuals from outside the United States (something hard 
to avoid when Linux that is a key part of the story is primarily overseen by a Finn 
who migrated to the United States around 1997 [Moody 2001]), but this is predom-
inantly a Silicon Valley–centred story. There is no mention in this technomyth of 
software industries from elsewhere in the world, and there is no adjustment to 
consider the equally prevalent sharing practices of others in this narrative. Open 
Source remains a resolutely Western story.
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Analysing the technomyth of Open Source ofers us a similar opportunity 
for analysis as that of the maker movement, revealing a technical focus close 
to determinism, a concentration on neoliberal capitalism and, by the 1990s, a 
Western centrism. We see some nuancing of the connection between Western 
and capitalist to a particular Silicon Valley vision of capitalism and a rejection of 
communal sharing of code. In this case, these inluences are so strong as to have 
obliterated not only the “non-Western” but also many other related practices of the 
Western world itself (such as free software).
Web 2.0 as technomyth: Fads, convergence and interactivity
On the other side of the 1998–2001 dot.com bubble (and burst) lies the technomyth 
of Web 2.0. The skeleton of the technomyth here is the emergence of the phrase 
“Web  2.0” as a signiicant moment through a conference from the publisher 
O’Reilly (the same who sponsored the conference that began the business promo-
tion of Open Source and who now publishes Make magazine and its highly 
protected branding apparatus). Founder Tim O’Reilly’s 2005 summary ofers the 
origin of Web 2.0:
The bursting of the dot-com bubble in the fall of 2001 marked a turning point for the web. 
Many people concluded that the web was overhyped, when in fact bubbles and consequent 
shakeouts appear to be a common feature of all technological revolutions. Shakeouts typi-
cally mark the point at which an ascendant technology is ready to take its place at center 
stage […] far from having “crashed,” the web was more important than ever, with exciting 
new applications and sites popping up with surprising regularity. What’s more, the compa-
nies that had survived the collapse seemed to have some things in common. Could it be 
that the dot-com collapse marked some kind of turning point for the web, such that a call to 
action such as “Web 2.0” might make sense? (O’Reilly 2005)
While Open Source rode the wave of the irst dot.com bubble, Web 2.0 responded 
to the bubble’s bursting. However, O’Reilly and others were responding with 
2.0 not only to the dot.com bust but also to the ongoing and exponential rise 
in numbers of users of the Internet, all through the boom, bust and afterwards 
(ITU 2006). The overriding theme of 2.0 was that the idea that it would bring 
a full realization of the convergence possibilities of the Internet in a new digital 
economy. As Caroline Bassett has argued, this put technological determinism at 
the heart of the Web 2.0: “Convergence discourses, leaning on a sense of onto-
logical revelation, by deinition entailed a destining of the cultural and the social 
by the technological, a sense that convergence in one domain, the domain of the 
technical, would have ‘inevitable’ consequences in others” (Bassett 2008).
The key narrative of Web 2.0 is convergence, meaning the bringing together 
of diferent media into one frame, and interactivity, in making these media active 
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by allowing users to interact with and continue adding to them. This is what the 
Internet has always enabled, such that the kinds of innovations Web 2.0 pointed 
to might most accurately be described as being part of the packaging and acces-
sibility of the Internet’s already existent forms of convergence. If social media 
like Facebook are the epitome of Web 2.0, then we should also recognize that all 
the interactive practices that converged in Facebook were available prior to it and 
other social media, such as chat rooms, messages, picture posting and sharing of 
media. Web 2.0 elides this to champion something “new” about convergence and 
interactivity, in order to attract attention and business back to the Internet. Again 
we see the theme of determination by the emergence of information technology. 
It is the particular repackaging of Internet-based capabilities, and the possibilities 
those technologies create, that seem core to Web 2.0 (Berry 2011: 56–61).
Having asserted something old as something new, and as a realization of the 
unrealized promise of Internet technologies, the focus on converged interactivity 
suggests also a particular kind of subjectivity in the Web 2.0 technomyth – that 
of the “ideal neoliberal subject.” Similar to that of the maker movement, it is 
conceived of through a sense of subjects being free. This occurs both in the sense 
of having the capacity to choose and in the sense of being without external control-
ling forces  […] the governable neoliberal subject is one who is a “self–steering 
Self.”  […] By not rigidly deining the relationship of the user to the technology 
and by allowing the “play” of creativity, interactivity refers to an already agential 
subject: a subject with the a priori power to act.  […] The Web  2.0 user thus is 
represented as both agential and endowed with freedom from externally derived 
controls (Jarrett 2008).
This kind of neoliberal capitalism needs not only certain macroeconomic 
features, such as withdrawal of the state in favour of market-based private enter-
prises, but also a kind of subjectivity that is consonant with neoliberal economic 
practices, and this subjectivity is embedded in Web  2.0 (Ringrose/Walkerdine 
2008; Van Dijck 2009; Crouch 2011).
Lastly for the Web  2.0 technomyth, and in a further echo of both maker 
movement and Open Source technomyths, the West is assumed here as the centre, 
and the rest of the world is an absence. Such an absence has already been criticized 
in many contexts, and we are not trying to assert anything new about the absence 
of non-Western perspectives here, except to note it is essential in understanding 
all three technomyths to know that an equally relevant proliferation of Global 
South and subaltern practices have been rendered invisible and non-inluential 
by these technomyths.
We might now wonder what other big technological stories of our time could 
be subject to this kind of analysis. Big Data? The Internet of Things? Unfortu-
nately, there is not space to consider them here. However, our arguments about 
Open Source and Web 2.0 do aim to build on those already made about the maker 
movement, while suggesting that even if diferent patterns and emphases occur, 
three key aspects are constitutive in all three technomyths: irst, technological 
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determinism of information technologies in general and the Internet in partic-
ular; second, neoliberal capitalism and its subjectivities as the ideal future; and, 
third, the absence and invisibility of the non-Western. Our comparison to jugaad, 
shanzhai and other non-Western grassroots techno-practices throws these three 
factors into especially sharp relief.
Conclusion
The 21st century has been marked by a seemingly never-ending series of tech-
nomyths focused on the Internet, from early hype about the Internet itself to the 
2010s when Big Data promised the “next big thing”; we now wait for the maker 
movement myth to progress while knowing that the “entanglements” of the 
Internet of Things may become the next focus (Edgerton 2011; Cukier/Mayer-
Schonberger 2013; Hills 2016). In this paper, we have presented an analysis of 
the ways that three broad sociotechnical innovations have been framed by main-
stream, Western-derived narratives. We have examined them genealogically, 
looking for absences, elisions and other sociocultural elements not foregrounded 
or acknowledged. We explored with the ideas of feminist materialists like Barad 
and Haraway in mind, seeking both to examine forms of power and to stay with 
the “messy” and interconnected troubles that constitute modern technologies 
across the world (Barad 2007; Haraway 2016).
By looking closely at the maker movement as a technomyth through compar-
isons to other practices, and then comparing this analysis to the Open Source 
and Web 2.0 myths that came before it, we have been able to argue that not only 
do enthusiastic, zeitgeist-like proclamations about Internet and information-
based technologies exist (something often noted) but these hypes take particular 
forms, framing societal possibilities through culturally unique perspectives to 
innovation itself. Here it is important to underline that we are not arguing that 
nothing is new. Instead, in each of the technomyths we have explored, we have 
noted that there are speciic technological origins, practices, economics and 
social interactions that are recognized – and many that are not. Our point here is 
that new technosocial practices are continually being channelled by inluential 
technomyths that frame, direct and disseminate practices in their own mythical 
images.
We have also argued that jugaad, shanzhai and OLPC appropriation demon-
strate what is neglected by the current dominant notion of the maker movement. 
The lack of communal, re-appropriated, necessity-based and non-Western uses 
of technology that we found were obstructed by maker movement progenitors 
has suggested three core constituents embedded within its claims: technological 
determinism, neoliberal capitalism and Western centrism. Our analysis of two 
further technomyths, Open Source and Web 2.0, has conirmed these constitu-
ents as key.
Brought to you by | University of Sussex Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/5/17 1:38 PM
Genealogy, Culture and Technomy th 41
A continued diiculty here is that our description has had to rely on the very 
broad categories of Western, neoliberal and technologically determinist. Each 
of these is complex in its own right, with substantial literature devoted to it, too 
substantial for proper analysis here. What we have been able to do is to identify 
openings or questions for future analysis of other technomyths. First, we have 
identiied the “West” as being formed not by a concrete conception of others but 
by a relation to absence. The non-Western is simply erased and ignored. This is 
something that juggad and other materialist practices fundamentally challenge, 
and it also suggests that attention should be paid in future to the techno-subal-
tern. Second, we have seen a particular economic subjectivity presumed, one that 
prioritizes the use of information technologies to act outside of state boundaries 
in the general pursuit of proit. This was most clear in Web 2.0 but is also present 
in other myths and is again clearly challenged by more community-centred eforts 
such as OLPC re-appropriation. Finally, we have seen how certain technologies 
are privileged as the drivers of technological determination. In all three Western 
technomyths, we ind a fascination with – and focus on – information technolo-
gies, with special attention on Internet technologies as determining social and 
cultural structures.
While we cannot hope to pin down exactly the complex meanings of what has 
been introduced here, we can argue that in examining technomyths, we would do 
well to ask three key questions: What is presumed to be absent in global terms? 
What kind of subjectivity is being proposed, particularly in relation to state and 
economy? What technologies are being privileged as the drivers of change? While 
we recognize extending such discussions is important, the arguments of this 
paper can only start to open up this further research. In short, while we acknowl-
edge our three pillars of technomyths – Western, neoliberal, technologically deter-
minist – connote large and complex concepts presented at a high level of abstrac-
tion, we believe this has been necessary in order to establish the fundamental 
positions of power that are embedded within myths like the maker movement.
What we also hope to add to existing debates through our analysis of “tech-
nomyth” and its efects is a means of understanding the pervasive ways that 
new creative and information technologies are being channelled, and especially 
how they might be directed diferently, particularly towards a greater focus on 
communal and subaltern uses of technologies outside of dominant Western narra-
tives. This genealogical perspective presents (and deies) a world in which infor-
mation technologies inevitably create social and cultural practices on the basis of 
Western values and the promotion of a neoliberal capitalism.
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Vĩa, V. (2012): “DIY in Context: From Bricolage to Jugaad.” In: Fadfest: Open 
design, Shared Creativity (https://www.scribd.com/doc/98988556/DIY-in-Con 
text-From-Bricolage-to-Jugaad).
Warschauer, M./Ames, M. (2010): “Can One Laptop per Child Save the World’s 
Poor?” In: Journal of International Afairs 64(1), pp. 33–51.
Weber, S. (2004): The Success of Open Source. Harvard: Harvard University Press.
Williams, S. (2002): Free as in Freedom: Richard Stallman’s Crusade for Free 
Software. Sebastopol: O’Reilly.
WIPO (2002): “What is Intellectual Property?” In: World Intellectual Property 
Organization (http://www.wipo.org/about-ip/en/).
Zhu, S./Shi, Y. (2010): “Shanzhai Manufacturing – an Alternative Innovation Phe-
nomenon in China: Its Value Chain and Implications for Chinese Science and 
Technology Policies.” In: Journal of Science and Technology Policy in China 
1(1), pp. 29–49.
Brought to you by | University of Sussex Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/5/17 1:38 PM
Brought to you by | University of Sussex Library
Authenticated
Download Date | 7/5/17 1:38 PM
